Leadership that completely ignores field agent concerns, combined with inconsistent communication protocols and a lack of preparation, lead to outcomes like the Secret Service’s failures on Jan. 6, 2021, former agents told the Daily Caller.
The Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) Office of the Inspector General (OIG) released a report July 31 detailing the agency’s performance on the day of the Capitol riot. A fundamental breakdown in inter-agency correspondence led to disparities in intelligence gathering and coordination between the agency and the United States Capitol Police (USCP), the former agents said.
“The bottom line that caused it all is, whether it’s a combination of the Capitol Police and the Secret Service or ultimately, the entity responsible for protection, were not prepared, or did not anticipate accurately, the necessary manpower,” former Secret Service agent Dean Peterson told the Caller. “Because of it, they were kind of caught off guard, and that led to some poor, in-the-moment decisions.”
The potential for chaos was obvious, however, according to Peterson, which render the mishaps “inexcusable.”
“I’m shocked, I guess, by what the intelligence community may or may not be communicating. I would think … you don’t need to be a part of these things and have intimate knowledge to have this perspective of like, ‘Wow, this is an unusual election circumstance,’” Peterson said.
The Secret Service said they fully cooperated with the OIG and have “taken steps to implement the majority of the recommendations” in the report, according to a statement they provided to the Daily Caller.
“The United States Secret Service (USSS) has a no-fail mission to protect our nation’s leaders. The actions taken by our agents on January 6, 2021 demonstrated their dedication to preventing harm to Secret Service protectees and assisting the U.S. Capitol Police,” the agency said. “We are continually improving protectee operations and benefit from oversight and investigations”
One example of the agency’s shortcomings was allowing Vice President-elect Kamala Harris to come within 20 feet of a pipe bomb at the Democratic National Committee (DNC) building in Washington, D.C, the OIG report notes.
The agency assigned two separate canine teams to sweep the DNC building where Capitol Police found the bomb the morning of Jan. 6 but did not assign an Explosives Ordnance Disposal team (EOD), which surprised agents on the ground, according to the report.
The Secret Service’s Operations Unit claimed that they didn’t request an EOD team because of a Department of Defense (DoD) rule that requires 72-hour advance notice for an EOD. The OIG, however, found seven occasions where EOD support was requested and approved despite being submitted less than 72 hours before a protectee’s visit.
“Regardless if it’s 72 hours or not, the job still needs to get done. If we’ve got a protectee that’s traveling to a location, the whole 72-hour thing, to me doesn’t make sense,” Michael Matranga told the Daily Caller.
The agency’s excuse was strange, Matranga says, and policy shouldn’t get in the way of safety.
A suspect allegedly planted two pipe bombs, one at the DNC and one at the RNC, the evening of Jan. 5, according to the FBI.
USCP received reporters of an “explosive device” at the RNC around 12:42 p.m. on Jan. 6, according to Republican Georgia Rep. Barry Loudermilk. Approximately 20 minutes later, officials discovered there was another “device” at the DNC while Harris was inside.
The violence at the Capitol had begun around 1 p.m., according to the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol’s report.
A group of young students appeared to walk in the vicinity of the alleged bomb at the DNC after officials had apparently discovered it was there, footage Republican Kentucky Rep. Thomas Massie provided to Revolver News’ Darren Beattie appears to show.
Law enforcement have not identified the suspect who allegedly planted the bombs, offering a $500,000 reward for any leading information.
The disarray is largely due to a lack of leadership, Matranga told the Caller.
“The problem is the 8th floor, which is headquarters. They’re just not listening,” Matranga said. “There needs to be some serious procedural and policy changes in order for them to adapt to the current threat landscape.”
The July 31 OIG report says intelligence agencies compiled an information packet that “contained some information indicating a potential threat against the Capitol” but that the Secret Service did not receive it.
Two Task Force officers from the Secret Service did report hearing “general information” about potential protests, but “nothing out of the ordinary or uncommon.” These officers, however, later discovered they were not included on an email list set up to monitor pre-inauguration threats, according to the OIG report.
Secret Service relies on intelligence agencies like the CIA, FBI and NSA to provide intelligence to them, but the process is far from streamlined, the former agents said.
People assume these agencies play nice, but Matranga told the Caller this isn’t always the case. Sometimes the agencies provide information that’s “very good,” while other times the intel is sorely lacking.
Matranga and Peterson spoke of a need for significantly more efficient communication between the agency and the intelligence organizations.
“The Secret Service, now, because of what they do, has to have a seat at the table … a more prominent seat at the table with the intelligence community,” Peterson said. “Far too many pieces of information do not get appropriately and timely communication, and that’s a huge issue.”
“At the end of the day, this is that breakdown in communication that has been going on for a very long time. It’s jurisdictional,” Matranga said.
Once the chaos began and protesters broke into the rotunda, the Secret Service’s Uniformed Division Chief offered to assist the United States Capitol Police (USCP) with extra officers. The chief then delegated that responsibility to the Assistant Chief, who told the OIG, “[He] thought the Chief requested another USSS official to assist with sending support to the USCP but did not know who.”
Ultimately, it took the Secret Service nearly an hour and a half to deploy additional officers to assist USCP after they initially offered their help, according to the report. The number of officers sent “may not have been the magnitude of assistance leadership anticipated.”
An email the Secret Service’s Protective Intelligence and Assessment Division (PID) sent to the Secret Service director at approximately 3:47 p.m. said they had sent 100 officers to the Capitol and would be deploying an additional 100 “within the next hour.”
The OIG found that the 100 number “far exceeded the actual number of officers that we could verify as present on the scene.” The report also says “Secret Service leadership provided inconsistent recollections of where these estimated numbers originated … ”
“What I have to believe is just either a lie about the available manpower or an egregious oversight of how manpower is allocated as a whole,” Peterson said of the response.
Some officers indicated they could have been better utilized to respond to rioters rather than securing the Dirksen Senate building due to their training and equipment, according to the report. Peterson concurred with their assessment.
“There was a very good group of available officers who could have immediately responded, because they are all trained to do that,” Peterson told the Caller.
Everyone is required to be prepared for civil disobedience, Peterson says, and the lack of additional support left him “a little confused.”
Matranga expressed an agency-wide lack of support in leadership. Peterson echoed that sentiment, noting that the agency may be better off if they cull some of their career bureaucrats.
The OIG made six recommendations to the Secret Service in their report, four of which the agency concurred with. The OIG suggested a reassessment of the Secret Service’s agreement with UCSP, improved policy guidance on requesting Technical Security Division (TSD) personnel, improved policy guidelines on requesting EOD personnel and an adequate procedure for ensuring the agency conducts after-incident reviews, all of which the Secret Service concurred with.
The Secret Service, however, did not concur with two of the OIG’s recommendations. The agency split from the OIG on their recommendations that they develop protocols for providing Civil Disturbance Unit (CDU) support to law enforcement and implement training for site agents on directing canine sweeps if there was no TSD on hand.
The agency said it was “opposed to developing and implementing protocols for providing CDU assistance to support law enforcement partners in the National Capital Region, even in the event of emergencies such as those that occurred during January 6, 2021,” according to the report.
“The Secret Service stated its primary mission limits its ability to provide emergency support to other law enforcement partners,” the OIG report notes.
An April 2022 update to the Secret Service’s operational procedures addressed “the need for site agents to be trained on directing canine sweeps” and requested the OIG close the recommendation.
Instead of addressing agents’ concerns, leadership encourages them to try to stretch their current resources, Matranga said.
“We got lucky on July 13. We absolutely got lucky.”
AUTHOR
Reporter.
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