When a violent attack, street-level confrontation, or political demonstration occurs in the United States, news commentators—including self-proclaimed national security experts—alongside policy analysts and law enforcement officials are increasingly using three standard terms:
“Jihadism,” “Islamism,” or a “Lone Wolf” attack.

Here is the objective reality: Every single one of those terms is a modern, Western-invented concept. None of them exist in classical Islamic law (fiqh), and none of them explain how these actions actually function on the ground. By increasingly adopting and propagating these false
terms, even commentators positioned as experts are reinforcing an analytical error that severely misdirects public understanding and operational defense.

When intelligence models rely on these political and psychological constructs, military planners and law enforcement agencies misclassify the threat environment across both individual and communal operational domains:

• The Individual Domain: When an actor uses a low-tech method—such as driving a vehicle into a crowd—police routinely label the perpetrator a mentally unstable “Lone Wolf,” write it off as a mental health event, or attribute the violence to some other obscure, non-ideological motive. Under classical law, however, the individual is executing a self-authorized Individual Duty (Fard ‘Ayn) that requires no central
  command, phone call, or organizational handler.
• The Communal Domain: When political coalitions, student organizations, and activist movements (such as demonstrations aligned with radical political factions, the Democratic Socialists of America, or keffiyeh-clad movements) assemble in major cities, analysts treat it as standard Western political speech or “Islamism.” In classical jurisprudence, this aligns with the communal phase of building local capability (Qudrah)
  and leverage through Dawa—which functions broadly as information warfare and psychological operations—to shape host-nation policy and public space.
• Local Municipal Dynamics: When local municipal dynamics shift—such as incidents in Dearborn, Michigan, where Christian pastors and proselytizers were harassed or arrested by municipal police at public events, or where private security fleets operate in marked vehicles mirroring law enforcement cruisers—analysts debate whether “Sharia law” has been formally enacted. In classical fiqh, this represents the incremental enforcement of community norms as local capability develops.

By misidentifying the operational playbook, Western analysts build broken threat models, induce law enforcement paralysis, and advance an asymmetric strategy that divides the domestic camp from within.

1. The Comparative Failure: Why “Islamism vs. Islam” and “Jihadism vs. Jihad” Break Down

Western policy networks and intelligence agencies attempt to solve the national security dilemma by inventing false dichotomies: separating “Islamism” from “Islam,” and “Jihadism” from “Jihad.”

From a classical legal and operational standpoint, these comparisons fail completely and
actively sabotage intelligence gathering:

• Western Analytical Dichotomy (Broken): Attempts to separate “Islam” (as a private religion) from “Islamism” (as a modern political ideology), or “Jihad” (as spiritual struggle) from “Jihadism” (as a militant ideology).
• Classical Sharia Legal Reality (Operational): Sharia is inherently an all-encompassing legal, political, civic, and military system. Jihad is a structured, legally binding duty categorized either as a Communal Duty (Fard Kifaya) or an Individual Duty (Fard’Ayn).

A. “Islamism vs. Islam”: The Secular Fallacy

• The Western Assumption: Western analysts assume that “Islam” is purely a private, spiritual religion, while “Islamism” is a modern political movement seeking to hijack the faith.
• The Classical Reality: In classical Sunni jurisprudence across all four legal schools (Shafi’i, Hanafi, Hanbali, Maliki), Sharia is inherently a total, all-encompassing system that governs civil law, criminal penalties (Hudud), international relations, trade, and governance. There is no secular-versus-religious split in classical fiqh.
• Why It Fails: By hunting for “Islamism” as a political ideology, analysts treat classical Sharia execution—such as political agitation, community organizing, or building local legal autonomy—as if it were a modern political party platform, leaving them legally paralyzed when encountering traditional legal adherence.

B. “Jihadism vs. Jihad”: The Authority Fallacy

• The Western Assumption: Western experts claim “Jihad” is either purely spiritual or strictly state-controlled, whereas “Jihadism” is a rogue, violent fringe ideology that distorts Islamic law.
• The Classical Reality: Classical fiqh manuals like ‘Umdat al-Salik (Reliance of the Traveller) define Jihad as a specific legal duty regulated by two states: Communal Duty (Fard Kifaya) under a state leader (o9.1), and Individual Duty (Fard ‘Ayn) when territory is compromised (o9.3). “Jihadism” is an empty label that describes nothing in classical jurisprudence.
• Why It Fails: When an individual carries out a strike, intelligence agencies look for
  evidence of “Jihadist radicalization” (foreign handlers, political manifestos). Because the
  actor is operating under classical Individual Duty (Fard ‘Ayn)—which requires no
  foreign boss or manifesto—investigators miss the legal driver entirely. Instead, they label
  the act as a mental health event, a lone wolf attack, or invent some other obscure, nonideological explanation to rationalize the violence.

2. The Classical Legal Playbook: Communal vs. Individual Action

To evaluate threat indicators accurately, actions must be measured against how classical Islamic law (Sharia) categorizes warfare and community action across the four legal schools (Shafi’i, Hanafi, Hanbali, Maliki). The law divides action into two distinct operational modes:

• Classical State / Communal Warfare (Fard Kifaya): Managed by state leadership or community leadership under baseline conditions, focusing on state expansion, policy, and capability building.
• Decentralized Individual Warfare (Fard ‘Ayn): Triggered automatically upon territorial entry or perceived hostility against host lands. It becomes binding upon every capable person locally, requiring no sovereign leader, network command, or
  organizational permission.

Mode 1: Communal Action & Political Agitation (Fard Kifaya & Dawa)

Under baseline conditions, military and political expansion is a communal duty (Fard Kifaya). When an official military or state apparatus carries out defense, the general population is exempt. In non-Sharia lands (Dar al-Harb), communal action manifests through political positioning,
coalition-building, public space enforcement, and Dawa:

• Classical Legal Definition of Dawa: In classical jurisprudence (fiqh), Dawa literally means “call” or “invitation” to Islam—specifically the legal requirement to invite nonMuslims to the faith prior to or alongside military action (as detailed in ‘Umdat al-Salik, o9.8–o9.9). Functionally, in non-Sharia environments, Dawa serves as the primary mechanism of information warfare, psychological operations (psyops), and asymmetric influence. It operates in the information domain to shape perceptions, neutralize scrutiny, build institutional leverage, and prepare the operational environment while in a state of weakness (Istid’af).
• Interfaith Outreach & Dialogue: Engaging host-nation religious leaders to build alliances and insulate local communities from national security scrutiny.
• Civic Bridge-Building: Establishing partnerships with local municipal boards, civil rights organizations, and academic institutions to gain public legitimacy.
• Refugee Resettlement & Social Services: Utilizing humanitarian and resettlement infrastructure to establish baseline community footprints and demographic expansion.
• Invitations to Islam & Campus Propagation: Public outreach and educational initiatives targeting student populations, media outlets, and political groups.
• Strategic Political Coalitions: Partnering with secular movements, student coalitions, or activist groups during public protests to amplify political leverage over host-nation policy.
• The Legal Mechanics: The Shafi’i manual ‘Umdat al-Salik (Reliance of the Traveller, Section o9.1) defines Fard Kifaya as a collective obligation. In the absence of a central state army, the obligation to advance the community’s legal and social standing defaults to collective public action and strategic information management (Dawa).
• Incremental Enforcement of Public Norms: Direct confrontations over public space—such as objecting to dogs in public areas based on classical ritual purity laws (Najasah), enforcing social codes, or utilizing private security patrols equipped with marked vehicles, light bars, and uniforms designed to mirror official law enforcement—represent the incremental application of communal pressure.
• The Dearborn Precedents: In Dearborn, Michigan, during the 2010 Arab International Festival, Christian missionaries (including Dr. Nabeel Qureshi and Pastor George Saieg) were confronted, pelted with objects by crowds, and subsequently arrested by city police officers for “breach of the peace.” The arrests led to federal civil rights lawsuits (Acts 17 Apologetics v. City of Dearborn), resulting in a 2013 court-ordered settlement and a formal public apology from the City of Dearborn. While analysts debated whether this constituted “Sharia law,” classical fiqh categorizes such enforcement as the incremental assertion of communal legal authority over local territory once a demographic baseline is reached.
• Scriptural Foundation: Surah An-Nisa (4:95) distinguishes between those who remain at home and those who strive collectively, establishing that under baseline conditions, communal advancement is carried by designated groups on behalf of the larger population.

Mode 2: Individual Duty (Fard ‘Ayn) & The “Lone Wolf” Fallacy

When non-Muslim forces enter Muslim territory, or when host-nation policies are perceived as actively hostile to the faith, the legal ruling automatically pivots from communal to individual obligation (Fard ‘Ayn).

When an individual carries out an attack alone—such as driving a vehicle into a crowd, executing a stabbing, or conducting an uncoordinated strike—law enforcement and media commentators routinely fail to recognize the legal mechanism at play. Instead, they label the perpetrator a “Lone Wolf,” characterize the incident as a mental health event, or attribute the
violence to some other obscure or workplace-related motive.

This is a fundamental intelligence failure. Under classical law:

• An individual executing an attack is executing Individual Duty (Fard ‘Ayn).
• Authorization is self-contained: The actor requires no phone call from an overseas handler, no organizational membership, and no formal command cell. The legal duty is embedded directly in the jurisprudence.
• The actor is not acting in an ideological vacuum; they are operating through a common orientation and understanding of Sharia shared across the global legal tradition.
• ‘Umdat al-Salik (Reliance of the Traveller, o9.3): Explicitly rules that when an enemy approaches or enters territory, “jihad is an individual obligation (fard ‘ayn) upon everyone in that land who is able to perform it… even if the husband or parents object.”
• Al-Nawawi (Al-Majmu’, Vol. 19, p. 263): Confirms that under defensive triggers, no authorization from parents, leaders, or creditors is required—the legal command is direct and personal.
• Ibn Taymiyyah (Majmu’ al-Fatawa, Vol. 28, pp. 358–359): States that defensive repelling of an aggressor is obligatory by consensus (ijma’), requiring no state sanction or organizational provisions.
• Scriptural Foundation: Surah At-Tawbah (9:41) commands believers to “Go forth, whether light or heavy, and strive with your wealth and your lives.” Classical exegetes like Al-Qurtubi explain that when general mobilization (Nafir ‘Am) is triggered, all peacetime legal exemptions drop away.

3. The Migration and Capability Playbook (Hijrah and Qudrah)

In non-Sharia environments, Western intelligence often misinterprets demographic movement
and community organizing as routine immigration. Classical fiqh structures this through a threestage legal continuum based on capability (Qudrah):

• Stage 1: Migration (Hijrah) & Dawa: Moving into new jurisdictions, deploying Dawa as an information warfare strategy (interfaith outreach, refugee settlement, dialogue, psyops, and community bridge-building), and establishing baseline infrastructure while in a state of operational weakness (Istid’af). Reference: ‘Umdat al-Salik (p29.1) on the duty of migration, and Surah An-Nisa (4:97–100) establishing that residing in lands where full religious law cannot be practiced is a temporary state contingent on weakness (Mustad’afin).
• Stage 2: Capability (Qudrah): Classical jurists establish that legal duties expand as capacity increases. Al-Sarakhsi (Al-Mabsut, Vol. 10, pp. 2–5) explains that in a state of weakness, Muslims withhold hands and engage in outreach (Dawa). As capability (Qudrah) develops, the legal duty to implement Islamic standards expands proportionally. Al-Mawardi (Al-Ahkam al-Sultaniyyah, Ch. 4) confirms that as local capability grows, the obligation to extend legal autonomy follows.
• Stage 3: Transition to Action: When capability is established, or host-nation policies create a perceived conflict, the framework activates Individual Duty (Fard ‘Ayn) to defend territory or enforce local legal norms.

4. Why Western “Isms” Have No Classical Legal Standing

Neither “Jihadism,” “Islamism,” nor “Lone Wolf” exist in classical legal manuals. When acts of unauthorized or indiscriminate violence occur, classical jurisprudence re-categorizes them under specific criminal headings rather than recognizing a new political “ism”:

• Hirabah (Unlawful Brigandage / Terrorism): Indiscriminate violence or street terrorism outside authorized state warfare is categorized in fiqh as Hirabah (crimes against public safety under ‘Umdat al-Salik, o15.1), governed by the severe penal limits of Surah Al-Ma’idah (5:33).
• Bughat (Unlawful Rebellion): Rogue militias or unauthorized groups operating without a recognized Imam are categorized as Bughat (rebellion under ‘Umdat al-Salik, o11.1).
• Khawarij Methodology: Vigilante takfir (excommunication) and combat that bypasses sovereign state law and traditional legal jurisprudence.

5. How the “Ism” Trap Paralyzes Law Enforcement & Intelligence

The misapplication of these Western terms severely impairs State and Local Law Enforcement (SLLE), Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTF), Fusion Centers, and military intelligence units across both the individual and communal threat spectrums:

• Problem A: Hunting for Bosses That Do Not Exist (Individual Breakdown): Local police threat models are designed to uncover conspiratorial networks—searching for phone records, financial transfers, or foreign handlers. When an individual executes a low-tech strike under Individual Duty (Fard ‘Ayn), there is no foreign paper trail. Police label the suspect a “lone wolf,” dismiss the incident as a mental health event, or cite some other obscure reason, closing the file without grasping the legal mechanism that drove it.
• Problem B: Looking for Mental Illness Instead of Legal Triggers (Operational Breakdown): Law enforcement training focuses heavily on psychological red flags (depression, internet usage, social isolation). However, an actor executing Fard ‘Ayn is responding to a legal trigger (such as overseas conflict or local capability shifts). Police monitor mental health indicators or hunt for obscure personal grievances while
  completely missing the legal driver.
• Problem C: Treating Incremental Subversion as Protected Political Speech (Communal Breakdown): When commentators and academic trainers convince police leadership that communal subversion is merely a “political movement” (“Islamism”), police chiefs fear civil rights litigation over First Amendment protected activity. Fearing accusations of profiling political activism—such as student protest coalitions, interfaith
  panels, or public demonstrations—police commands order officers to stand down, allowing local capability (Qudrah) and institutional subversion to build unmonitored.

Summary of Findings & The Imperative for Classical Legal Literacy

To defeat an asymmetric strategy, threat models must evaluate adversary behavior through its actual operational playbook, not Western political categories:

• The Double Blind Spot: Law enforcement is currently failing on both fronts. On the individual front, they misdiagnose self-authorized Fard ‘Ayn strikes as isolated “lone wolf” attacks, mental health events, or obscure personal breakdowns. On the communal front, they misdiagnose incremental subversion, political agitation, and capability building (Qudrah) as standard First Amendment political speech.
• The Operational Driver is Classical Law (Sharia): Actions move dynamically between state/communal efforts (Fard Kifaya), information warfare and strategic outreach (Dawa), migration (Hijrah), capability building (Qudrah), and self-authorized individual defense (Fard ‘Ayn) as detailed in foundational legal manuals like ‘Umdat al-Salik.
• The Threat of Catastrophic Failure: By relying on flawed behavioral models and invented “isms” (“Islamism vs. Islam” / “Jihadism vs. Jihad”), law enforcement and intelligence agencies face catastrophic institutional failure. Without grounding threat analysis in classical fiqh mechanics—and receiving rigorous operational training from primary-source subject matter experts who evaluate threat vectors strictly through
  classical Sharia doctrine—state, local, and federal defense architectures will remain functionally blind to individual strikes, paralyzed before communal subversion, and vulnerable to internal domestic collapse.

Closing Analysis: Institutional Illiteracy & A Legacy of Primary-Source Analysis

The breakdown in national security occurs when official architectures ignore classical Islamic law and primary-source doctrine, leading directly to strategic illiteracy in defense and allowing unchecked influence operations to advance unmonitored.

The Leadership and Foundation: Coughlin and Guandolo

The real-world consequences of ignoring primary-source Islamic doctrine are powerfully illustrated by the pioneering work of Major Stephen Coughlin (ret.) and John Guandolo. Together, Coughlin and Guandolo stand as the preeminent, go-to global experts on counterterrorism, classical Islamic doctrine, the Muslim Brotherhood, and Sharia law—providing the definitive operational framework for analyzing domestic and international threat architectures.

• Major Stephen Coughlin (ret.): An attorney, former Army Military Intelligence officer, and former Senior Islamic Law Analyst for the Joint Chiefs of Staff J-2 at the Pentagon, Coughlin was recognized as the only global intelligence analyst to accurately predict the Arab Spring long before it unfolded. His landmark 2007 National Defense Intelligence College master’s thesis, “To Our Great Detriment”: Ignoring What Extremists Say About Jihad, and his definitive book, Catastrophic Failure: Blindfolding America in the Face of Jihad, detailed how an ideologically driven purge and strategic illiteracy across federal defense agencies left Western intelligence blind to domestic and international Muslim
  Brotherhood influence operations. As highlighted in briefings such as Stephen Coughlin, Part 4: Muslim Brotherhood, Arab Spring & the ‘Milestones’ Process, Major Coughlin demonstrated how relying on artificial Western definitions while suppressing primarysource Sharia analysis led to catastrophic foreign and domestic policy failures.
• John Guandolo: Complementing Coughlin’s strategic Pentagon intelligence analysis, Guandolo represents the premier operational authority on identifying and dismantling domestic Muslim Brotherhood networks. A U.S. Naval Academy graduate, former U.S. Marine Corps Infantry and Reconnaissance officer, and former FBI Special Agent, Guandolo created and implemented the bureau’s first comprehensive training curriculum detailing Islamic doctrine, the Muslim Brotherhood, and global jihadist networks. He authored foundational texts like Raising a Jihadi Generation, delivered threat-focused operational briefings, and trained federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies, military personnel, and elected officials on identifying and dismantling domestic threat networks across the United States. Author’s Operational Synthesis: The “Isms” Theory The formulation of the “Isms” Theory presented throughout this brief is not an abstract academic exercise. It is the direct result of nearly two decades of training, operational work, and mentorship under the tutelage of both Major Stephen Coughlin and John Guandolo. Having learned under their foundational work—grounded strictly in primary-source classical fiqh and uncompromised counterintelligence mechanics—this assessment approaches the threat with deep professional humility, aiming to carry forward the analytical discipline they pioneered. The core takeaway of the “Isms” Theory is simple: We cannot defeat an adversary whose playbook we refuse to read in its original legal form. Nor can we defeat an enemy when we insist on defining him through a Western lens, while stubbornly refusing to define him as he defines himself or fail to understand the doctrine and laws that he explicitly states animate him. By framing threat vectors through manufactured Western labels—”Jihadism,” “Islamism,” and “Lone Wolf”—our defense and law enforcement architectures have unwittingly adopted a language that guarantees strategic blind spots. Grounding our national security strategy in the primary-source methodology established by Coughlin and Guandolo is the only path toward ending institutional paralysis, restoring accurate Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield, and protecting the homeland from catastrophic failure.

Author’s Operational Synthesis: The “Isms” Theory

The formulation of the “Isms” Theory presented throughout this brief is not an abstract academic exercise. It is the direct result of nearly two decades of training, operational work, and mentorship under the tutelage of both Major Stephen Coughlin and John Guandolo. Having learned under their foundational work—grounded strictly in primary-source classical fiqh and uncompromised counterintelligence mechanics—this assessment approaches the threat with deep professional humility, aiming to carry forward the analytical discipline they pioneered.

The core takeaway of the “Isms” Theory is simple: We cannot defeat an adversary whose playbook we refuse to read in its original legal form. Nor can we defeat an enemy when we insist on defining him through a Western lens, while stubbornly refusing to define him as he defines himself or fail to understand the doctrine and laws that he explicitly states animate him.

By framing threat vectors through manufactured Western labels—”Jihadism,” “Islamism,” and “Lone Wolf”—our defense and law enforcement architectures have unwittingly adopted a language that guarantees strategic blind spots. Grounding our national security strategy in the primary-source methodology established by Coughlin and Guandolo is the only path toward ending institutional paralysis, restoring accurate Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield, and protecting the homeland from catastrophic failure.

©2026 Randy McDaniels. All rights reserved.